dropbear: security update to 2016.74

- Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection.

  If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system
  (validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root
  when connecting to Dropbear server.

  A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially
  run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts
  or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program.

- Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as
  the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files

- Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if
  particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where
  dbclient is used in scripts.

- Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the
  running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v

  The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with
  Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html

Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>

diff --git a/package/network/services/dropbear/Makefile b/package/network/services/dropbear/Makefile
index c87361168831b6dc10f81a3c66f568d495b203a8..8c9b45f486d8da6a2aa4c08a3c46d24bb36f151c 100644 (file)
--- a/package/network/services/dropbear/Makefile
+++ b/package/network/services/dropbear/Makefile
@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=dropbear
-PKG_VERSION:=2016.73
+PKG_VERSION:=2016.74
 PKG_RELEASE:=1
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
        http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/ \
        https://dropbear.nl/mirror/releases/
-PKG_MD5SUM:=8d6d78ce60ca52350ec04fcbd711ce9b
+PKG_MD5SUM:=9ad0172731e0f16623937804643b5bd8
 
 PKG_LICENSE:=MIT
 PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE libtomcrypt/LICENSE libtommath/LICENSE